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Objective. The specific objective of this first audit in this series was to determine whether those information systems and the data contained in those systems used by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Project and Contracting Office to monitor Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects were adequately reliable and sufficiently coordinated among those organizations to ensure the accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials and the Congress on the use of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funds.
Results. The Section 2207 Report for April 2005, compiled by the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office, did not meet the congressionally mandated requirement to include estimates, on a project-by-project basis, of the costs required to complete each project. As a result, without current and accurate cost-to-complete data, it is difficult to determine whether funds are available to complete ongoing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects and for the initiation of new projects (finding A).
The accuracy of the $7.9 billion of Department of Defense obligations reported on the Secretary of the Army Report issued March 27, 2005, could not be verified. Further, information that was incorporated into the Section 2207 Report, including the Secretary of the Army Report, was not required to be verified for accuracy by the U.S. government organizations providing that information. As a result, our audit was unable to verify the accuracy of the data submitted through the Secretary of the Army Report to Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. Further, without a requirement to verify the submitted data, U.S. government organizations could submit unverified data to Iraq Reconstruction Management Office for inclusion in the Section 2207 Report. Finally, because no verification was required or performed by the Project and Contracting Office, including information submitted by other organizations through the Project and Contracting Office, there is no assurance that Congress was provided valid information through the Section 2207 Report that is needed to exercise oversight of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq (finding B).
Management Actions. During our audit, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office initiated procedures for preparing and reporting cost-to-complete estimates and will begin reporting that information in the Section 2207 Report for September 2005. On June 10, 2005, the Project and Contracting Office began reporting cost-to-complete estimates to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office.
Recommendations. We recommended that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office require that current and best estimate for cost-to-complete information be provided for inclusion in the Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (Recommendation A.2.). We also recommended that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office require that the data provided by U.S. government organizations responsible for managing the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund for the purposes of inclusion in the Section 2207 Report be verified for accuracy before submission (Recommendation B.2.).
Further, we recommended that the Director, Project and Contracting Office:
• Complete the integration of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System database with the Project and Contracting Office Oracle Project Accounting interface (Recommendation A.1.a.)
• Finalize and update, on a project-by-project basis, the accurate and complete costs required to complete each project (Recommendation A.1.b.)
• Ensure that management controls over the Secretary of the Army Report, such as reconciliation procedures, result in verifying the accuracy of the submitted data (Recommendation B.1) 
Cost-to-Complete Estimates.
Developing a cost-to-complete estimate is an integral component of cost management. Cost-to-complete estimates should be made on an iterative basis, taking into account the reasons for variances from initial estimates. Costto-complete estimates should be developed as follows:
• Determine the progress toward contract completion to date
• Determine the cost of the contract work completed to date
• Determine the reasons for variances from initial estimates
• Estimate the amount of work remaining to be completed
• Estimate the cost of the work remaining to be completed 
Objectives
The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether information systems used by U.S. government organizations result in the effective management of IRRF programs. An additional objective was to determine whether those information systems used by U.S. government organizations were adequately reliable and sufficiently coordinated among those organizations to ensure accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials and the Congress on the use of IRRF funds.
The specific objective of this first audit in this series was to determine whether those information systems and the data contained in those systems used by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and the PCO to monitor IRRF projects were adequately reliable and sufficiently coordinated among those organizations to ensure the accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials and the Congress on the use of IRRF funds.
We will address the overall objective in subsequent audits. Specifically, we plan to perform follow-up audits of the estimates of cost-to-complete prepared by the PCO. We also plan to perform follow-up audits on the accuracy of the data reported in the Secretary of the Army Report and the Section 2207 Report and on management controls over the data reported.
For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix D.
A. Undeveloped Cost-to-Complete Estimates for Iraq Reconstruction Projects
The Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (Section 2207 Report) for April 2005, compiled by the IRMO, did not meet the congressionally mandated requirement to include estimates, on a project-by-project basis, of the costs required to complete each project. The IRMO did not report the cost-to-complete data because PCO project management personnel did not complete the integration of program and financial data systems and did not develop the required cost-to-complete estimates for the Section 2207 Report. As a result, without current and accurate cost-to-complete data, it is difficult to determine whether funds are available to complete ongoing IRRF projects and for the initiation of new projects. 
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Development of Cost-to-Complete Estimates by PCO
The Section 2207 Report on for April 2005, compiled by the IRMO, did not meet the congressionally mandated requirement to include estimates, on a project-by-project basis, of the costs required to complete each project. The IRMO did not report the cost-tocomplete data because PCO project management personnel did not complete the integration of program and financial data systems and did not develop the required costto-complete estimates for the Section 2207 Report. PCO officials cited a number of constraints that hindered the development of cost-to-complete estimates including: difficulty integrating data among financial and project management information systems, incomplete program management data, and rapidly rising security costs.
Systems Integration Issues at the Project and Contracting Office. PCO management has experienced difficulties integrating financial and program management data across its management information systems infrastructure. For example, the PCO Oracle Project Accounting interface with the CEFMS database has not been completed because there is not a compatible common project code identifier that the two systems share. The inability to share data has negatively impacted the PCO ability to link the financial information in CEFMS to program information. Consequently, it is difficult for project managers to prepare cost-to-complete estimates. In response to our draft audit report, the PCO officials stated that in coordination with IRMO and effective June 2005, it had fully implemented the procedures that support the monthly reporting requirement to develop and submit updated cost-to-complete estimates for Sector Project Codes and related construction projects. PCO officials stated they have provided the cost-to-complete estimates for each project (defined as a major task order) to IRMO.
Conclusion
Estimating cost-to-complete for each project is a challenging but congressionallymandated requirement in Iraq. Progress on reconstruction projects is sometimes difficult to determine. The lack of adequate automation support also adds to the difficulty. However, decision-makers need an accurate picture of funds required to complete projects currently underway. Without current and accurate cost-to-complete data, it is difficult to determine whether funds are available to complete ongoing IRRF projects and for the initiation of new projects.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit
B. Accuracy of the Secretary of the Army Report
The accuracy of the $7.9 billion of Department of Defense obligations reported on the Secretary of the Army Report issued March 27, 2005, could not be verified. Further, information that was incorporated into the Section 2207 Report, including the Secretary of the Army Report, was not required to be verified for accuracy by the U.S. government organizations providing that information.
This occurred because PCO finance personnel could not provide transaction level details of obligations that were reconcilable to obligations contained in the Secretary of the Army Report and the Section 2207 Report, and because the IRMO had not established a requirement that submitted data for the Section 2207 Report be verified before submission.
As a result, our audit was unable to verify the accuracy of the data submitted through the Secretary of the Army Report to the IRMO. Further, without a requirement to verify the submitted data, U.S. government organizations could submit unverified data to the IRMO for inclusion in the Section 2207 Report. Finally, because no verification was required or performed by the PCO, including information submitted by other organizations through the PCO, there is no assurance that the Congress was provided valid information through the Section 2207 Report that is needed to exercise oversight of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Obligation Transaction Data
We requested obligation transaction data to support amounts reported on the March 27, 2005, Secretary of the Army Report. The PCO provided an obligation transaction listing to us, retrieved from the CEFMS, which at the time it was provided was to be representative and reconcilable to the Secretary of the Army Report. During our audit, it was determined that the data provided, although not significantly different, could not be reconciled to the reported obligation amounts in the Secretary of the Army Report.
Obligation Transaction Listing
The accuracy of the $7. The Project and Contracting Office Position. We requested transactional data from the PCO to support amounts reported on the March 27, 2005, Secretary of the Army Report. The transactional data that was provided by the PCO for our review was not reconcilable to the Secretary of the Army Report and consequently did not meet our audit objectives. We were advised by PCO finance personnel that the CEFMS did not have a standard management report to support such a request but that CEFMS programmers had been asked to develop a program to provide the requested information.
When we inquired about these differences, PCO finance personnel advised that:
A nominal difference exists between the SecArmy Report and the detailed transaction listing supplied to the AFAA [sic] auditors in Baghdad. The Sec Army Report reflects valid, supportable, and certifiable figures that are obtained from the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS). The detail transaction listing is an internal analysis tool generated from CEFMS intended to be used by resource managers to identify material increases/decreases in sector/program accounts. The detail transaction report was never created to be used as a certifiable report. It is a reconciliation tool.
CEFMS does not presently have available a comprehensive report that lists every individual transaction rolling up to AMSCOs [Army Management Structure Code], allotment serial numbers and appropriations, as such a report has never been required to reconcile CEFMS internally, though HQUSACE [Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] could certainly program such a report. CEFMS was designed as a 'one entry updates all applicable general ledgers and subsidiary ledgers', and almost all transactions are updated in real time. Reconciliation routines are run each night to insure the general ledger and subsidiary ledgers are reconciled.
The detail transaction report we provided the auditors was never represented as a transaction file that reconciles exactly Sec Army data. The auditors needed a tool to select obligation transactions to test, we provided this, however not every transaction will be in the provided data. For example labor, cost transfers, and interest payments would not be in the data set provided -our data set would only capture transactions linked to an undelivered order obligation document (emphasis added in bold). CEFMS cost transfers are accomplished at the Work Item Code (WIC) level, and are not attached to obligations. Interest payments work the same way, and labor transactions do not become obligations until t&a [time and attendance] data is signed, going from certified commitment to accrued expenditure, not tied to an undelivered order. All these transactions are captured on the SecArmy Report but not on the detailed obligation transaction report.
When the SecArmy and Transaction Listing reports are compared at summary level, there is less than a quarter percent difference. This is a reasonable difference that provides a high level of assurance that the funds are being properly accounted for.
We plan to perform follow-up audits of the accuracy of the data reported in the Secretary of the Army Report and on management controls over the data reported.
Verification of Submitted Data
The information that was incorporated into the Section 2207 Report, including the Secretary of the Army Report, was not required to be verified for accuracy by the U.S. government organizations providing that information. This occurred because IRMO had not established a requirement that submitted data for the Section 2207 Report be verified before submission.
Certification of Data.
According to PCO officials, the PCO is not required to certify the accuracy of the submitted data that is input into the Secretary of the Army Report. Further, according to PCO officials, the Secretary of the Army Report is compiled by the PCO from various Department of Defense organizations that manage and utilize funds obtained through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office Position. IRMO officials provided informal comments to our draft report and stated that they have management controls in place to ensure accurate data is provided to them on a weekly basis. However, those officials also stated that the Secretary of Army Report is not an IRMO report and that they do not know what management controls are in place for this report. Given that the Secretary of the Army Report is the basis for the information that is provided to IRMO for the Section 2207 Report, we asked how IRMO ensured that this data were validated for accuracy. Officials at IRMO stated that they only collated and prepared the Section 2207 Report for transmission by the Department of State to Congress. When IRMO officials were asked if they required that the information they reported to Congress be validated, they said no but agreed that it should be and would request that the data being provided to them for the purposes of the Section 2207 Report be verified for accuracy.
Reconciliation of the Submitted Data
We do not believe that the PCO can assert that "The Secretary of the Army Report reflects valid, supportable, and certifiable figures that are obtained from the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS)" when it can neither provide support for such a statement nor reconcile the reported figures to detailed transactions.
Further, we also do not believe that the PCO can argue that "The detail transaction report was never created to be used as a certifiable report" and that "The detail transaction report we provided the auditors was never represented as a transaction file that reconciles exactly Sec Army data" and simultaneously maintain that "When the Secretary of the Army and Transaction Listing reports are compared at summary level, there is less than a quarter percent difference. This is a reasonable difference that provides a high level of assurance that the funds are being properly accounted for." We find these statements to be contradictory.
Finally, we do not understand the PCO position that "The detail transaction report is an internal analysis tool generated from CEFMS intended to be used only by resource managers to identify material increase/decreases in sector/program accounts" and yet state "it is a reconciliation tool" when it cannot be reconciled to the data reported for the Secretary of the Army Report.
Conclusion
We were unable to verify the accuracy of the data submitted through the Secretary of the Army Report to the IRMO. Further, without a requirement to verify the submitted data, U.S. government organizations could submit unverified data to the IRMO for inclusion in the Section 2207 Report. Finally, because no verification was required or performed by the PCO, including information submitted by other organizations through the PCO, there is no assurance that the Congress was provided valid information through the Section 2207 Report that is needed to exercise oversight of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response B.1. We recommend that the Director, Project and Contracting Office ensure that management controls over the Secretary of the Army Report, such as reconciliation procedures, result in verifying the accuracy of the submitted data.
Management Comments. The Director, PCO, did not concur with our recommendation. The Director, PCO, stated that the Secretary of the Army Report is a weekly update for Army management that was never intended to be a certified report. The Director, PCO, further stated that because the PCO compiles data which is generated from multiple Department of Defense accounting systems, certification of the report is not possible by the PCO.
Audit Response. We agreed and changed our report accordingly.
B.2. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office require that the data provided by U.S. government organizations responsible for managing the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund for the purposes of inclusion in the Section 2207 Report be verified for accuracy before submission.
Management Comments. The Acting Director, IRMO, concurred with the recommendation through informal written comments. The Acting Director, IRMO, stated that the data provided to them does not have to be certified but that the accuracy of the data should be verified by the various organizations submitting the data to IRMO.
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology
We interviewed management personnel within the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) and reviewed organizational charts and relevant program memoranda to gain an understanding of the entities' operations to include their organization, management style, and the internal and external factors influencing their operating environments.
We We performed our audit in Baghdad, Iraq, at the Presidential Palace, where we interviewed PCO finance and senior management personnel and IRMO budget and operations personnel and reviewed IRRF program and financial data, and at the PCO Annex, where we met with PCO project management and information technology personnel and reviewed project management data.
We conducted this performance audit from March through July 2005, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Use of Computer-Processed Data. We performed tests to verify automated financial data maintained by the PCO through a comparison of reported balances to detail transactions records and by comparing detail transactions to source documents. We also utilized computer assisted audit techniques to identify potential duplicate obligations. The audit results indicated that the detailed transaction records provided to us by the PCO were not representative of data input to the summary PCO records and, therefore, not valid or reliable for verification by audit.
Prior Coverage. There were no audits performed in the past 5 years with the same or similar objectives as this audit.
